1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
3	DEVAN GRINER,)
4) Plaintiff,
5	vs.)
6	JOSEPH R. BIDEN, in his official) capacity as the President of the)
7	United States of America; the) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED) Case No. STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND) 2:22-CV-149 DAK
9	HUMAN SERVICES; XAVIER BECERRA, in) his official capacity as Secretary) of the United States Department of)
10	Health and Human Services; CENTERS) FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES;)
11	CHIQUITA BROOKS-LASURE, in her) official capacity as Administrator)
12	for the Centers for Medicare and) Medicaid Services; MEENA SESHAMANI,)
13 14	<pre>in her official capacity as Deputy) Administrator and Director of) Center for Medicare; and DANIEL)</pre>
15	TSAI, in his official capacity as) Deputy Administrator and Director)
16	of Center for Medicaid and CHIP) services.)
17	Defendants.)
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19	BEFORE THE HONORABLE DALE A. KIMBALL
20	DATE: JULY 6, 2022
21	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
22	MOTION HEARINGS
23	
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25	Reporter: REBECCA JANKE, CSR, RMR (801) 521-7238

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JULY 6, 2022 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 3 12:26:32 All right. We're here this morning in THE COURT: the matter -- on Zoom in the matter of Griner vs. Biden, et 5 It's 2:22-CV-149. Let's see. 12:35:24 al. 7 Plaintiff is represented by Mr. George Wentz; is 12:36:00 that correct? 8 MR. WENTZ: That's correct, Your Honor, with the 9 10 Davillier Law Group. THE COURT: And defendants are represented by 11 Mr. Joel McElvain; is that correct? 12 12:36:12 MR. MC ELVAIN: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: I have about an hour and a half, which 14 ought to be plenty. I've read the materials. Let's see. 1.5 We have a motion to dismiss and a motion for preliminary 16 12:37:46 17 injunction. Mr. McElvain, why don't you start and tell 12:37:59 me -- tell me why you think the motion should be -- your 18 motion should be granted to dismiss, and as you're telling 19 me that, you'll tell me why plaintiff shouldn't have a 20 preliminary injunction. 21 And then, Mr. Wentz, you'll tell me the opposite. 22 And if you each don't take too long, you'll have some time 23 12:38:27 to rebut. So you've got 45 minutes each total. 24 Mr. McElvain, go ahead. 25

MR. MC ELVAIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Covid 19 1 has over taken the 1918 Influenza Pandemic as the deadliest 2 disease in American history. It has been particularly 3 12:38:56 deadly for patients at hospitals, nursing homes and other 5 facilities funded by the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Ιn the face of this crisis, perhaps the most basic function 6 12:39:29 that the Secretary of Health and Human Services performs, as 7 the Supreme Court put the matter earlier this year, quote: 8 Is to ensure that the healthcare providers who care for 9 12:39:51 Medicare and Medicaid patients protects their patients' 10 health and safety. 11

> That is a quote from the Supreme Court's decision in Biden vs. Missouri from earlier this year. The Secretary exercised this basic function by finding that vaccination of healthcare workers against Covid 19 was necessary for the health and safety of the individuals to whom care and services are furnished. That, again, is a quote from the Biden vs. Missouri decision, which in turn is quoting the Secretary's Federal Register Notice. That determined -excuse me. That determination, was based on data showing that the Covid 19 virus can spread rapidly amongst healthcare workers and from them to patients.

> > THE COURT: When you --

MR. MC ELVAIN: And that such --

THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. McElvain.

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1 MR. MC ELVAIN: Yes, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: When you're reading something, you might have to slow down. Remember we have a reporter that has to take down everything that you say.

MR. MC ELVAIN: Thank you, Your Honor. I will try to do that.

That determination was based on data showing that the Covid 19 virus can spread rapidly amongst healthcare workers, and from them to patients, and that such spread is more likely when healthcare workers are unvaccinated.

Again, I am quoting from the Supreme Court's decision in Biden vs. Missouri. On the basis of these findings, the Secretary issued a rule that conditions federal funding for a healthcare facility on that facility's development of policies to ensure its healthcare staff either obtain vaccination or claim an exemption from doing so. The Supreme Court has upheld both the Secretary's statutory authority to issue that rule and his rational basis for doing so. Again in the Biden vs. Missouri decision.

THE COURT: Mr. McElvain, let me ask you to comment on the --

MR. MC ELVAIN: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: -- on the plaintiff's apparent position that -- that these are not really vaccinations, they are

12:49:21 1 some form of a medical treatment.

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MR. MC ELVAIN: Yes, Your Honor. So, as the Court is aware, under the Jacobson decision from the Supreme Court, which is a 1905 decision of the Supreme Court, which is still good law today, there is no due process right to avoid vaccination. And to apply modern day constitutional law parlance to the Jacobson holding, the Supreme Court applied rational basis review to a vaccination requirement. The Secretary's rule here easily satisfies rational basis review because there is ample evidence to show that the vaccines are effective in protecting against Covid 19 and preventing the spread of Covid 19.

Now, as I understand the plaintiff's argument, the plaintiff argues that the Jacobson rule should not apply because in his view the Covid 19 vaccinations are more akin to medical treatment rather than vaccines. So the plaintiff cites the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan, C-r-u-z-a-n, which recognized, at least in dicta, a due process interest in avoiding unwanted medical treatment. But even the Cruzan case itself, in that case the Supreme Court cited Jacobson for the proposition that any such liberty interest is outweighed by the government's interest in preventing disease by requiring or encouraging vaccinations.

The plaintiff argues that Covid 19 vaccinations are medical treatment rather than vaccinations because the

vaccines are not, in his view, effective. But the central 1 12:56:17 point of the Jacobson case itself is that Courts lack the institutional capacity to second-guess policy makers as to 3 12:56:52 whether vaccines are effective in preventing disease. 5 the facts of the Jacobson case itself. That case involved a criminal prosecution, and the defendant there had argued 6 12:57:26 7 that some doctors did not believe that vaccinations would prevent the spread of smallpox, but the Supreme Court held 8 12:58:02 that it is the role of policy makers, not the Courts, to 9 evaluate opposing theories of how best to, quote, meet and 10 12:58:22 suppress the evil of a smallpox epidemic that imperils an 11 entire population, end quote. 12

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The Supreme Court went on to acknowledge the, quote, possibility -- again I am quoting from the Jacobson opinion -- the possibility that this belief may be wrong; that is the belief that vaccines were effective, and that science may yet show it to be wrong, end quote, but held this was -- again, I am quoting -- held this was not conclusive, for the legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.

I would refer the Court also to the District of New Mexico opinion in the Valdez case, which was recently affirmed in an unpublished opinion by the Tenth Circuit which analyzed Jacobson along these lines.

So essentially the Supreme Court in Jacobson 1 13:02:30 applies purely rational basis review and, again, the 2 Secretary has ample grounds, certainly at least a rational 3 basis to conclude that vaccines are effective in controlling 13:02:53 the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes Covid 19. 5 And, again, the Supreme Court has already essentially told 6 7 us that because the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to this same rule on arbitrary and capricious grounds when it 8 13:04:21 followed that if the Rule was not arbitrary or capricious 9 for purposes of the Investigative Procedure Act, the same 10 analysis leads to the conclusion that the Rule is -- is 11 13:04:57 rational for purposes of due process review. 12 So, just to briefly recount the evidence -- and let 13 me pause. Can you still hear me, Your Honor? 14 13:05:30 THE COURT: I can. 15

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MR. MC ELVAIN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. So to briefly review the evidence, as the Secretary recounted in the Rule itself, the Covid 19 vaccines are effective in preventing serious outcomes of the disease. They offer strong protection against hospitalization and death. They are particularly effective in preventing infection among front line workers and vaccinated people with breakthrough infections may be less infectious than unvaccinated individuals, resulting in fewer transmission opportunities for the virus. These are from pages 61565, 61585, 61558 of

the Federal Register Notice that the Secretary issued in 1 November of last year, and we cited portions of the Rule in 2 our brief.

> Even after November, 2021, when the Rule was issued, the evidence continues to show that vaccines are effective. The vaccinated are better protected against the virus than are unvaccinated. Even today the evidence continues to show the Covid 19 hospitalization rate for unvaccinated adults even after the emergence of the Omicron variant this year, it's five times higher than that for fully vaccinated people without a booster. And that's the evidence that we have cited to in our brief that I refer you to in our motion to dismiss.

The vaccines also protect against reinfection for persons who have previously been affected with the Covid 19 virus under the April 15, 2022 study that we cited in our briefs to that effect. And furthermore, the most recent evidence also indicates that the vaccinated are less likely to transmit the virus, including the Omicron variant of the virus, than are the unvaccinated. Again, we have cited numerous studies in our briefs to this effect.

So the plaintiff responds -- as I understand the plaintiff's argument, the plaintiff responds with -- with some, you know, scientific data of his own, and I think I should begin by noting that nothing that the plaintiff cites

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changes the analysis here one way or the other. Even if --1 13:19:56 even if you take the plaintiff's argument at his own terms, 2 all he has shown is there may be some dispute within the 3 scientific community as to how effective the vaccines are. 5 Under the Rule of Jacobson, this is simply irrelevant. rational basis review applies here, and so long as the 6 Secretary has a reason to believe that there is some 7 13:20:22 evidence out there that supports the view that are vulnerable patients will be protected, that is really all 9 that matters for rational basis review. 10

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In any event, the plaintiff mis-cites his own sources. For example, he relies heavily on recent documents from the FDA from December 2020 when the vaccines were being presented for their initial proof or initial authorization. But, again, that's data from December 2020, and the fact that it's not yet known at that time how effective the vaccines were in preventing transmission is simply beside the point because this is a rule that was issued 11 months later, on November 20, 2021, at which time substantial evidence of protection against transmission had been developed.

Plaintiff also refers to a study that he claims shows that the vaccines have negative efficacy; that is, that the vaccines actually increase the likelihood a person would transmit -- would come down with Covid 19. This is

Exhibit T to plaintiff's reply brief. But the study simply does not say that. What the study says is that it initially found a negative result which was based on data anomalies, and a fuller, broader review of the data actually confirmed that the vaccines are effective. I would urge the Court to look at pages 11 and 12 of Exhibit T to plaintiff's reply which demonstrates that point.

So at bottom plaintiff's argument seems to be impercibly based on the notion that a vaccine must be 100 percent effective to qualify as a vaccine. But this isn't the standard, and no vaccine, even the one against smallpox at issue in Jacobson, could possibly meet that standard. Instead, the important point here is that the vaccines help to protect vulnerable populations, patients in hospitals, residents in nursing homes and other patients at other facilities funded by the Medicare and Medicaid programs. And they protect them from the deadliest disease in American history. At the very least, the Secretary could rationally so conclude. It defeats plaintiff's due process claim.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. I think you mentioned this, but one of plaintiff's arguments, as I understand it, is that even if it's reasonable and legal to require vaccinations for people who have not been previously affected with Covid that, since he has, then he shouldn't be required to be vaccinated.

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13:28:55	1	MR. MC ELVAIN: That is a fair statement of
	2	plaintiff's claim that is incorrect, both from the evidence
	3	we know today, and even the evidence that was available to
	4	the Secretary in November 2021. We know that the vaccines
	5	are effective in preventing Covid 19 or helping to prevent
	6	Covid 19, even among those who were previously infected.
13:29:27	7	The Secretary so found that in his rule, as we have cited to
	8	the portions of the Rule in the briefs based on the
	9	scientific evidence available to him at the time, and there
	10	is an April 15, 2022 study which confirms this point, that
	11	vaccines protect against reinfection for persons who have
13:29:59	12	previously been affected with the SARS-CoV-2 virus. That
13:30:15	13	cite specifically is ENT Plumb, et al., P-l-u-m-b. The
	14	title of the study is Effectiveness of Covid 19 MRNA
	15	Vaccination in Preventing Covid 19 Associated
13:30:59	16	Hospitalizations Among Adults With Previous SARS-CoV-2
	17	Infections, United States June 21 to February 2022.
13:31:20	18	That's a mouthful, I acknowledge, but that full
	19	citation appears in our brief, so I would refer you to our
13:31:53	20	briefs for the citation there. So the bottom line is there
	21	is evidence there is at least a rational basis, but there is
	22	certainly quite a bit of evidence to show that the vaccines
	23	are effective in in preventing Covid 19 both among people
	24	who have never had the disease before and among people who

have experienced a prior infection.

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THE COURT: Don't you also argue about standing and ripeness here?

MR. MC ELVAIN: Yes, Your Honor. I'll turn to that if the Court so prefers. To begin with standing, standing requires an actual or threatened injury that is both real and immediate. If you look at the allegations of the Complaint, the Complaint alleges simply that the hospital in which he, plaintiff, has a right to practice, receives EMS funding, that's paragraph 41 of the Complaint. That's it. That is the only allegation of the Complaint. This is not enough because an Article III injury must be more than a possibility. That's a quote from the Essence, Ink case of the Tenth Circuit.

Rather, a plaintiff must show that his -- it has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury.

The Complaint does not contain any allegations that any hospital has suspended or revoked plaintiff's practice privilege or even has discussed with him whether his privileges would continue if he does not obtain vaccination for Covid 19.

So the Complaint simply does not, within its four corners, show any injury in fact. And I refer the Court again to the Essence Ink case in which the Tenth Circuit held that where a plaintiff's claim involved suspension for

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revocation of a right or privilege, which is what the claim 1 13:37:23 is here, on an allegedly unconstitutional basis, the 2 plaintiff must allege either that a party has sought to 3 suspend or revoke the privilege or has threatened to do so 5 or any fact indicating that suspension or revocation may be 13:37:58 imminent or that the plaintiff has altered behavior as a 6 7 result of the challenged provision in order to show the 13:38:12 plaintiff's standing.

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Again, the Complaint contains no such allegation.

Now, the plaintiff has in fact submitted some new evidence with his opposition to the motion to dismiss, and I would begin by noting that this is simply immaterial to a facial challenge to the Complaint. On a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the Complaint itself must show the plaintiff's standing. If the four corners of the Complaint do not show that standing, any later submitted evidence is simply beside the point. But, in any event, even this new evidence does not carry plaintiff's burden.

Although plaintiff asserts that HCA, HCA Hospitals have told him that they will revoke his privileges, none of the submitted notices from HCA actually state that. And I would refer the Court to Exhibits B, C, D and E of plaintiff's opposition memorandum, ECF number 22-3-4-5 and-6. And although plaintiff asserts that he received an

13:41:17	1	email informing him that his requested medical exemption was
	2	denied, the record email doesn't say that either. Again,
13:41:53	3	please look directly at Exhibit T. Rather, what happened
	4	was is that the attachment that plaintiff submitted as proof
	5	for his reason for declining Covid 19 vaccination has been
	6	reviewed and rejected, seemingly because it was signed by
13:42:29	7	plaintiff himself and not by a separate healthcare provider.

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So the email invited the plaintiff to fill in the medical exemption form and to resubmit it, to have it signed by another doctor to resubmit it. So, again -- so nothing happened to plaintiff. At least in the evidence that we have before us, all we have is an email saying: Please resubmit your exemption request.

We don't know what, if anything, happened then. The plaintiff simply has not carried his burden for standing.

For similar reasons, the claim is not ripe. I know that the Court is familiar with the standard Black Letter formulation for ripeness. A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all. That's from the Texas vs. United States decision in 1998. Under the ripeness inquiry, the Court looks both to the fitness of the issues for decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration at this time.

Again, the vaccination rule does not directly 1 impose any obligation on individual practitioners. Instead 2 14:01:28 the Rule applies to facilities, like hospitals, requires 3 them to develop their own plans and policies to ensure their 14:01:46 staff are fully vaccinated unless found to be exempt. 5 simply don't know how those policies will be applied by the 6 7 hospitals at issue here. The hospital may end up determining that plaintiff could be exempt or they may 8 otherwise determine that he is not included in the category 9 14:02:17 of staff to whom a vaccination protocol would apply. 10 without that -- being aware of how this will actually be 11 applied, plaintiff's claim is unfit. And for the same 12 reason, there is no hardship from the Court's 13 14:02:52 (unintelligible) review at this time. 14 So that resolves the issue of subject matter 1.5 jurisdiction for plaintiff's Complaint. But of course his 16 Complaint also fails to state a claim. 17 THE COURT: What else do you want to tell me? 18 MR. MC ELVAIN: Well, I'll turn next to the 19 statutory authority claim, if I may. 20 14:03:29 THE COURT: 21 Sure. MR. MC ELVAIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 Complaint alleges that the Rule is invalid and that it, 23 quote, rests upon a general police power asserted by the 24 14:03:44 federal government. This is incorrect. 25 The Secretary has

1 express statutory authority for the Rule, and the Supreme
14:04:05 2 Court has upheld the Secretary's use of this authority. The
3 Supreme Court noted that the Secretary has the, quote,
4 general statutory authority to promulgate regulations as may
5 be necessary to the efficient administration of the function
6 with which he is charged. That's the Biden vs. Missouri

decision quoting 42 U.S.C. Section 1302(a).

As I've already quoted at the outset of my presentation, one such function, perhaps the most basic given the Department's core mission is to ensure that the healthcare providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients protect their patients' health and safety. To that end, Congress authorized the Secretary to promulgate, as a condition of all facilities' participation in the program -- excuse me, Your Honor -- such requirement as he finds necessary in the interest of the mental health and safety of individuals who are furnished services at the institutions. That, again, is a quote from Biden vs. Missouri, in turn quoting 42 U.S.C. Section 1395x, subsection (e), paragraph 9. And that is the provision that deals specifically with hospitals.

So here the Secretary found that his role was necessary to promote and protect patient health and safety, and the Supreme Court accordingly held that the Rule thus fits neatly within the language of the statute. It would be

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the very opposite of efficient and effective administration for a facility that is supposed to make people well to make them sick with Covid 19.

So the Secretary has express statutory authority under the Medicare and Medicaid statute, and this disposes of the plaintiff's police power claim as well. The Rule was issued as a condition of funding under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Congress has the power under the spending clause to impose conditions on the use of federal funds, even where it legislates in an area historically of state concern. This is the Sabri case from the Supreme Court, S-a-b-r-i. It is in our brief. In this case -- I'm sorry, not in this case -- in Biden vs. Missouri, the Supreme Court saw the vaccine rule as a predictable exercise of the Secretary's health and safety authority and that, in keeping with other CMS regulations, such as those requiring hospitals to maintain effective infection prevention and control programs.

I would refer the Court to page 651 of the Supreme Court's decision in Biden vs. Missouri.

So this rule no more intrudes on the states' police power anymore than the existing infection control regulations do. Thus the Secretary is able to prescribe standards to make sure that, say, a doctor with the flu doesn't report to work that day. The Secretary is also --

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14:11:50 1 is also within the Secretary's authority to prescribe
2 standards for vaccination, to be sure that the vulnerable
3 patients are protected at facilities funded by the Medicare
14:12:48 4 and Medicaid programs.

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I've already addressed the due process claim although I'd be happy to answer any further questions the Court may have on that. And that would leave the equal protection claim, which I will touch on briefly. There is no fundamental right or suspect class involved here as we have already discussed. There is no fundamental right to a avoid vaccination. So, therefore, rational basis review applies for purposes of the equal protection claim in the same way that it applies for the due process claim. And the Rule is certainly rational for purposes of equal protection for the reasons that we have already discussed.

It is plainly reasonable for the Secretary to distinguish between the vaccinated and unvaccinated because the latter are significantly more likely to contract, spread, be hospitalized for and die of Covid 19. And for this reason, the Court has uniformly rejected equal protection claims challenging Covid 19 vaccination requirement. There is the Does case, Does 1 through 6 case of the First Circuit in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari. There's the Valdez case from the District of New Mexico that I've already mentioned, which was recently

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That leaves us with the remaining factors for preliminary injunction. Of course if the motion to dismiss is granted, then that would solve the PI motion. Plaintiff's cannot show a likelihood of success. concludes the inquiry as to the request for a preliminary injunction. They cannot satisfy the remaining factors either. And, again, I believe that the Court is aware, under the Dine' Citizens case in the Tenth Circuit, each of the four elements for preliminary injunction must be met independently. The prior standard under prior law, a sliding approach to preliminary injunctions, has been overruled, and the plaintiff's must prove that it is able to satisfy each of the four elements for preliminary injunction; first, the likelihood of success, which we have already discussed; second, the existence of an irreparable harm. But the plaintiff's alleged harms here are purely economic.

The plaintiff has not shown that any harm is imminent for the reasons that I've already discussed, and furthermore, the delay in bringing the suit and in bringing the preliminary injunction motion and in prosecuting the preliminary injunction motion undercuts any claim of imminent harm that would support a claim of irreparable harm. The Complaint was filed two weeks after the deadline

14:23:10 in Utah for full compliance with -- for facilities full compliance with the Rule, and plaintiff took the full time 2 to brief the PI, which does not support a claim that there 3 is any imminent injury claim here. And, finally, the public interest and the balance 5 14:24:00 of the equities weigh in favor of the Secretary here. 6 7 is no doubt of course that stemming the threat of Covid 19 14:24:11 is a compelling safety threat. The Supreme Court has so acknowledged. And the balance of equities weighs sharply in 9 favor of minimizing the spread of a deadly virus in 10 federally funded hospitals. And I would refer the Court 11 14:25:28 again to the analysis of the Valdez opinion in the District 12 of New Mexico which was recently affirmed by the Tenth 13 Circuit. 14 14:25:54 And with that, I would rest, but I would invite any 1.5 questions that the Court might have. 16 THE COURT: Well, I don't have any right now. 17 Thank you, Mr. McElvain. 18 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. MC ELVAIN: 19 THE COURT: Mr. Wentz. 20 21 MR. WENTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 14:26:28 THE COURT: I do have -- I assume you'll cover 22 23 these. I want you to explain how you get around Missouri V. Biden. 24 MR. WENTZ: 25 Yeah.

THE COURT: And I'm also interested in -- in ripeness, standing, injury. But you're going to cover all that anyway, so go ahead.

MR. WENTZ: Well, Your Honor, I was hoping I would get that done. So, I see that you have seized on what I think is probably the main issue in the case in your first question, which is that every time that we argue that there is a fundamental right at stake here, the defendant transforms our Complaint and converts it into a claim that we are not making. So I just want to make it really clear to the Court that we are not saying, and have never said that Dr. Griner enjoys a substantive due process right to not take a vaccine.

What we are saying is, Judge, this is not, as a matter of fact, a factual assertion. This is not a vaccine. And if this is not a vaccine, and what the government has said during the -- during its presentation, is that it reduces the symptoms, it makes it less likely you will be hospitalized. All of the language there doesn't focus on the true definition of a vaccine. What it focuses on is the definition of a treatment. And I'd like to walk the Court through all the evidence before it that shows that this is not, as a matter of fact, a vaccine but is indeed a treatment. And in doing so --

THE COURT: How does that -- but doesn't Jacobson

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cover that -- I mean. Excuse me. Doesn't Missouri V. Biden cover that? I mean, they have upheld the Rule.

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MR. WENTZ: They have upheld the Rule, but no one made the argument that this is not a vaccine. There has never been a factual assertion made in any case I'm aware of that this is not a vaccine, so we have two different motions under two different standards before the Court as I know you obviously know, but with regard to what was starting, what the government started was it motion to dismiss. I want to point out to the Court that what the government did there was argue facts. They say it really does do this or it really does do that, or, Judge, here's a study that shows. Right?

So what the Court has before it with regard to the motion to dismiss is a huge factual issue that, on a motion to dismiss, is beyond the scope. So, what we are saying is that, as a factual issue, this is a -- this is not a vaccine. And this is -- this is a really significant distinction. This was never argued in Biden V. Missouri, Your Honor. This never came up. It's not in the Complaint. You can look through the Complaint and see that it was never argued. So, if in fact -- and that's why a rational basis was applied, because the government's correct that in Biden V. Missouri there was no fundamental right at issue. They do have that right, Your Honor.

No one claimed what we are claiming. That's the distinction that we have here. No one claimed. We can not be asserted -- that can't be a res judicata on us because it was never even argued. It was never even touched on it. The Court did a statutory analysis. The same is true with the constitutional argument that we make, which is not a statutory argument at all. I mean, what the government keeps doing is rewriting our Complaint for us. But, Your Honor, we're the plaintiffs, and we get to make the claims that we want to make, and we want to get the facts that we want to make here.

And so, what we're not saying is that it's an ultra vires claim on the basis of the statute. The statute does give the authority. That's as far as the Supreme Court ever got in Biden. What we're saying, Your Honor, harkens back to NFIB V. Sebelius, and in that case, what the Court said was that we have a dual sovereignty structure of our nation. The structure of the constitution diffuses power between various governmental centers to protect individual liberty. Justice Roberts gives quite an eloquent statement of the function of dual sovereignty and, in that case, finds that the federal government does not have the police power to push a medical result, mandate someone to buy insurance, medical insurance. That's the holding of that case.

Now, that was never touched on and never argued in

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Biden vs. Missouri, and I think it's still a live issue, and 1 14:33:52 that's what we're asserting there. With the equal 2 protection argument, going back to the motion to dismiss 3 aspect of it, if we do have a fundamental right to not take 5 a medical treatment, which is the argument being made, then there is a fundamental right at stake. So, what happens is 6 the government just keeps assuming away the primary factual 7 14:34:32 issue before the Court which is, is this a treatment or is it a vaccine? With regard to the motion to dismiss, as long 9 as that fundamental factual issue remains, then it's not 10 within the province of the Court at this stage of the 11 proceedings to make those factual determinations and dismiss 12 14:34:59 That's our fundamental position, Your Honor, with 13 the case. regard to the motion to dismiss. 14 I need to hit -- which would you rather have me do, 15 Your Honor? I'll take your quidance. Should I go through 16 the motion for preliminary injunction factors and show you 17 why we have a high likelihood of success on the merits at 18 14:35:25 this point in time and come back and hit the standing issues 19 after that? 20 THE COURT: That's all right. 21 MR. WENTZ: Is that okay with you, sir? 22 Yes. Just don't take forever. THE COURT: 23 MR. WENTZ: I'm going to try not to, sir. 24 I know what the standards are. 25 THE COURT: I just

want to know how you think you meet them.

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MR. WENTZ: So -- and I think you are clear on our claim. We are not claiming that we have a fundamental due process right to not take a vaccine. We're claiming under Cruzan we have a fundamental right not to be forced to take a medical treatment. That's the key issue. And I would point out that they don't challenge that. The government is not challenging that.

So, I'd like to refer the Court to footnote 3 of the Complaint. This is a critical issue. This is the CDC's definition of immunity and vaccine that was taken from its website before it was changed on September 1, 2021. And this is the definition upon which all of the law regarding mandatory vaccines has been decided. This definition is also the basis of the statutes regarding vaccination and the creation of the vaccine court as we point out in our Complaint. So this definition is critical.

Here's what the CDC defined the word "immunity" as prior to September 1, 2021. Here's the definition:

Protection from an infectious disease. If you are immune to a disease, you can be exposed to it without becoming infected.

That's the definition of immunity. Then they move on to define "vaccine." And it says: A product that stimulates a person's immune system to produce immunity to a

specific disease, protecting the person from that disease.

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So, up until September 21 -- September 1, 2021, vaccines create immunity, and if you're immune you don't get the disease if you're exposed to it. The government has now changed that long-standing definition of what a vaccine is to remove the concept of immunity altogether, but, at the same time, the government is relying on cases that assume the old definition. So all the public policy, all the statutory, everything, it all talks about immunity. There's cases that say vaccination is the gold seal of immunity. Well, they are. This is not a vaccination because it doesn't even create immunity. So, that's the fact issue.

And here's -- here's what I think is interesting about this case and where we are, Your Honor. The government urges you, and I think quite rightly, not to become a scientist, not to become a policy maker. They say you can't step in and do that. But you don't need to do that, Your Honor. You're not going to have to replace your judgment for the judgement of the government agencies to see that this vaccine does not create immunity, this so-called vaccine. You don't need to dive into the science because all you need to do is take the word of the manufacturers of the injections together with documents produced by government agencies and statements made by government officials to see that these so-called vaccines do not create

immunity.

The Court could also just watch the news where everyday someone like Dr. Fauci or the President or the Queen of England, who is fully vaccinated comes down with the virus.

I would like to quickly walk you through the evidence that shows why we have a likelihood of success on the merits of showing the Court that this is not a vaccine, it's a treatment.

First. The FDA itself classifies the injections as treatments, not vaccines. And the documentation for that is in footnote 24 of the Complaint in paragraph 53.

Second. Both Moderna and Pfizer have filed documents with the Securities & Exchange Commission, public documents, pointing out that their injections are considered gene therapies, as we state in paragraph 54 of the Complaint. Obviously a therapy is a treatment, Your Honor, not a vaccine.

Third. As we show the Court in our reply brief, the trials conducted by the FDA for the emergency use and authorization of the injections did not even attempt to see if the injection created immunity as the CDC had always defined it prior to September 1, 2021. It based its effectiveness on reduced symptoms, not immunity.

Fourth. Here's Moderna's Chief Medical Officer.

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1 He says that the EUA trials, the emergency use authorization
2 trials, Your Honor, don't show that the vaccine prevents
3 transmission of the virus. That's a direct quote. They
4 don't show the vaccine prevents transmission of the virus.

That's in paragraph 52 of our Complaint.

Fifth. The fact that the CDC had to change its definition on September 1, 2021, to exclude the word "immunity" is telling.

Sixth. We recount in our Complaint many public statements by government officials, including Dr. Fauci, including the Director of the CDC itself, and including the chief scientist of the World Health Organization, who admitted, and they admit again, that the injections do not prevent the transmission of the virus. They do not create immunity.

Seventh. This is the CDC website. It says -- this is a direct quote: The CDC expects that anyone with Omicron infection can spread the virus to others, even if they are vaccinated or don't have symptoms. See paragraph 49 of the Complaint, Your Honor.

Finally, the Court can just look at the CMS mandate itself. And that says, quote: The effectiveness of the vaccines to prevent disease transmission by those vaccinated is currently not known. Close quote. So the CMS itself doesn't even know if this prevents transmission. That's

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paragraph 38 of the Complaint, Your Honor.

So, looking at official statements and evaluating what they say is squarely within the millhouse of the Court. It's right in your comfort zone. What they are asking you to do is look at the science, get into detailed reports. We provide those because we want to have a well-pleaded Complaint, but you don't have to become a scientist, all you need to do is look at these statements that the policy makers themselves are making because they are telling you what we are telling you. These injections do not create immunity.

And they were aware of this to the extent that they changed the very definition of what a vaccine is to make this vaccine fit in it. And those are the facts.

But the law, Your Honor, hasn't changed. The law from congressional statutes to case law still assumes that a vaccine creates immunity. Indeed that's the only reason to force people to take a vaccine. It's the common good of preventing transmission of the disease, other people from getting infected. So what we ask the Court to do with regard to the motion to dismiss, to dismiss, is to give us the benefit of our well-plead facts, and with regard to the likelihood of success on the merits in terms of our preliminary injunction, to look at the overwhelming evidence as stated by everyone we just cited and determine that an

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injunction does not -- an injection, an injection that does not create an immunity is not a vaccine but is some other kind of thing.

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And you also don't have to become a scientist to figure out what other kind of thing it is because the same policy makers and the same officials go on to tell you what it is, Your Honor. What they say is that it reduces symptoms. That's the classic definition of a treatment. But they actually do more than that because they call it a therapy themselves. We start with the fact that the manufacturers --

THE COURT: I thought the classic definition of a treatment or the better definition of a treatment was it cures something.

MR. WENTZ: Well, that would be true. That would be true, Your Honor. I give the example in our papers of a headache. If I went out and imbibed too much the night before and I had a headache the next day, if I took aspirin and it reduces my symptoms that's a treatment. That's the classic treatment for a hangover. But if I could take those pills the night before and I would never get a hangover, I've got a vaccine. I'm immune. That's the fundamental distinction.

And there's a heck of a slippery slope argument that we can get into, Your Honor, because if we can mandate

treatments for the reasons that the government wants to 1 mandate these treatments, then my goodness gracious, there's 2 no end to what the government can do. A lot of the 3 government's arguments, there's no end to what the 5 They might be able to tell me, because government can do. they want to reduce hospitalizations, that if I didn't eat a 6 14:48:29 Big Mac, I'm not gonna -- likely to have a coronary and end 7 up in the hospital. They might tell me I shouldn't have 8 salt. They might tell me I should go to a daggone (as 9 spoken) exercise class and ride a cycle every morning, which 10 my wife tells me as well. But no one has the authority to 11 14:48:58 mandate that, and certainly not the federal government. 12 But if we allow this slippery slope -- this is the 13 whole reason for Cruzan, I think, Your Honor, is that you 14 have to -- you have to make a distinction between the 15 treatments that help people and make them better, make 16 symptoms less severe, maybe make them stay out of the 17 14:49:28 hospital -- we even give them that -- and a vaccine, which 18

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If you don't eliminate transmission, that third-party societal benefit is simply not present. That's critical. That's the critical thing here.

because it eliminates transmission of the disease to others,

there's a third-party societal benefit to mandating it.

THE COURT: Basically all your arguments hinge on -- well, except perhaps for injury, and we'll get to

that, I suppose, but they really hinge on whether this thing 1 is an vaccine or a treatment; is that correct? 2 MR. WENTZ: Your Honor, that's the biggest fact 3 question, and that is before the Court. We want to put that 4 5 We think we have a right to go forward. on trial. THE COURT: All right. What about -- what about 6 standing, ripeness and injury? 7 14:50:28 MR. WENTZ: All right. Well, Judge, they don't 8 want to allow you to look at any of the emails because they 9 say they are not within the four corners of the Complaint, 10 but they are the ones that are raising the fact issues. 11 They are the ones coming back factually saying -- raising 12 14:50:49 fact issues. Number 1. We can respond to those, and you 13 have the authority under 12(b)(1) to look at those. You can 14 do that. That's what the rule says. 1.5 THE COURT: Well, has your client been denied any 16 privileges yet at the hospital? 17 MR. WENTZ: It's right there in the emails. 18 14:51:30 been denied privileges at two hospitals, two HCA hospitals. 19 The other thing is that those emails say specifically that 20 the hospitals implemented those policies directly as the 21 14:51:55 result of the CMS mandate. They actually say: We didn't 22 want to do this. We wanted to avoid this, but with the CMS 23 mandate in place we're forced to do it. 24 25 THE COURT: Forced to do what? I thought they said

he could apply for an exemption or fill out more forms or something, that their decision is not complete.

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MR. WENTZ: Well, he filed for an exemption. What they are saying -- and it was denied. And that's a factual issue, too, Judge. I mean, they raise all these facts, but they are trying -- they are trying to get you to throw this case out, obviously, and that's what I would do if I was on the other side. I'd try to get you to throw it out at the beginning. But I think they are trying to also make you sit as a finder of fact, which I don't think you're supposed to do at this point in the case.

Now, with regard to the -- with regard to the evidence, they are saying you shouldn't even look at these emails, but, Judge, I don't know if you read them, but they are pretty clear. They say you don't have privileges unless you are fully vaccinated. And then when he applies for a medical exemption on the basis of his having previously been infected. They rejected that as well. Now, today the government is arguing other things, but those are facts, and we would like to -- we would like to have the opportunity to put our man on trial.

I mean, before -- these are -- you know, you have the authority under 12(b)(12) to have an evidentiary hearing on this issue, and if you are taking it as seriously as I believe you might be, that might be the best result, and we

14:54:22 1 would applaud that because we think that we can show all the
2 Lujan factors, Your Honor. We've got concrete injury. The
3 concrete injury is the direct result of the defendant that
14:54:57 4 we have sued, and we have you sitting in the chair being

6 factors, and we have shown them all.

able to resolve it for us.

They say that it's not ripe. They say that there's no concrete injury, that nothing has actually happened yet. They say in their papers, well, Dr. Griner hasn't actually scheduled a patient and come in and been arrested and had that patient not be able to be operated on.

Those are the three Lujan

And, Judge, I don't know if you've read his declarations -- and, plus, his declarations contain additional allegations, and they were included with the Complaint, his initial declaration. That's another point, Your Honor. He goes through very carefully and he lists the hospitals where he works, and he says: I can't work there.

He makes those allegations under oath, integrated in the four corners of the Complaint because it's Exhibit A thereto. That's a critical point as well, Your Honor. So, what they are saying about having him to schedule, if this is the standard, this just doesn't make any sense. Your Honor, this guy's a doctor. He's spent his entire life healing kids. He set up a foundation to heal kids. He has people that go and talk to kids and counsel kids because

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they have had post-traumatic stress because the injuries
they were born with are so traumatic.

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And the government is saying that we've got to take one of those kids and the family of that kid and we have to knowingly set up an operation that we know we cannot do because we have been told we can't do it in writing by the hospital itself, and we've got to put that family through all that stress and we've got to do all that? The poor kid is sitting there saying: Oh, my Lord, I'm about to be healed. Thank God. My cleft lip, my cleft pallet. I'll be able to eat. I'll be able to gain weight. Maybe I'll be able to go to school and be a normal human being.

All those hopes and aspirations in that little kid's head. And then, all the stress about a hospital. He's got to go through all that? They're saying we have to put a kid through all that to prove that there's a concrete injury? That just can't be the standard, Your Honor. This reminds me of the old villain movies where the villain would put the heroine on the railroad tracks. Well, we've got the heroine on the railroad tracks. We've got Snidely Whiplash standing there, and we've got the train coming, Your Honor. That's an imminent threat.

We don't have to have the heroine run over by the daggone train before we know there's an imminent threat of injury. And that's what we have. We have an imminent

threat of injury right here. He cannot go in. You want him
to go get arrested? I don't think he has to do that on
these facts, Your Honor. That's not the standard. And
that's not the standard of ripeness either. We have a ripe
case. We have concrete injury. We have all the Lujan
factors.

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Then I'll point out, Judge, that at the same time that the government is telling us that we're not ripe, they're saying that we sat on our rights, and they are making some sort of a laches argument. I think they have to pick their poison. They are saying that we delayed, but they are saying that we don't have a case; we either filed it too soon or we filed it too late. They claim, Judge -- and this goes to irreparable harm. They claim that -- they claim that we filed the suit two weeks after the thing went into effect. But that's not the case. It was delayed until February 28. Now that's in Dr. Griner's declaration and it's in our pleadings.

And we filed on March 4, so that's a four-day delay. That's my fault if there's a delay. We wanted to get you a good case. We wanted to write the best possible case that we could. And the same thing for the motion for preliminary injunction. So we just respect the Court's time. The other thing is, they are saying that you should -- there is no irreparable harm because we allowed

15.00.07	1	the Count to have its named massadure. But that I would not
15:02:27	1	the Court to have its normal procedure. But that's really
	2	honestly the best way for the Court to make the best
	3	decision is on full briefing. That's one of the reasons why
	4	the Biden vs. Missouri decision doesn't do anything for us.
	5	It was a preliminary injunction motion. The Court was only
	6	opining on, you know, what might succeed, likelihood of
15:02:59	7	success. Even at the Supreme Court, that was the standard.
	8	That's not a final determination on anything.
	9	That's another reason Griner I mean Biden vs. Missouri is
	10	distinguishable from what's before the Court today. So, I
15:03:25	11	believe I've hit everything except for do you have
	12	anymore questions on the standing and the ripeness?
	13	THE COURT: No.
	13 14	THE COURT: No. MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal,
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15:03:54	14	MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal,
15:03:54	14 15	MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal, Judge. Thank you. But I I would I would direct the
15:03:54	14 15 16	MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal, Judge. Thank you. But I I would I would direct the Court to the evidence before it that this is a treatment,
	14 15 16 17	MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal, Judge. Thank you. But I I would I would direct the Court to the evidence before it that this is a treatment, and the FDA's emergency authorization use trials only tested
	14 15 16 17	MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal, Judge. Thank you. But I I would I would direct the Court to the evidence before it that this is a treatment, and the FDA's emergency authorization use trials only tested for it being a treatment. Your Honor's chief medical
	14 15 16 17 18	MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal, Judge. Thank you. But I I would I would direct the Court to the evidence before it that this is a treatment, and the FDA's emergency authorization use trials only tested for it being a treatment. Your Honor's chief medical officer said the trial results show that the vaccine can
	14 15 16 17 18 19	MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal, Judge. Thank you. But I I would I would direct the Court to the evidence before it that this is a treatment, and the FDA's emergency authorization use trials only tested for it being a treatment. Your Honor's chief medical officer said the trial results show that the vaccine can prevent someone from getting sick or severely sick; however,
	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal, Judge. Thank you. But I I would I would direct the Court to the evidence before it that this is a treatment, and the FDA's emergency authorization use trials only tested for it being a treatment. Your Honor's chief medical officer said the trial results show that the vaccine can prevent someone from getting sick or severely sick; however, the results don't show the vaccine prevents transmission.
	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. WENTZ: I'll shut up on that. Clear signal, Judge. Thank you. But I I would I would direct the Court to the evidence before it that this is a treatment, and the FDA's emergency authorization use trials only tested for it being a treatment. Your Honor's chief medical officer said the trial results show that the vaccine can prevent someone from getting sick or severely sick; however, the results don't show the vaccine prevents transmission. That's our Complaint in paragraph 52. It was treated as a

injections reduce symptoms, not transmission, which are at

length in our Complaint.

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The CDC website, it says, quote: Current vaccines are expected to protect against severe illness, hospitalizations and death due to the infection with the Omicron variant. However, breakthrough infections in people who are vaccinated are likely to occur. People who are up-to-date with their Covid 19 vaccines and get Covid 19 are less likely to develop serious illness than those who are unvaccinated and get Covid 19.

So, once again, it is a treatment. It is not creating immunity. So you don't have to become a scientist. All you got to do is look at the very statements that government officials have made, all of which you're entitled to do, and you can see that we have presented the Court with a fact issue that this is a treatment under Cruzan, not a vaccine under Jacobson. And, if that's the case, then the case survives the motion to dismiss, and because we're using all of the evidence on this issue from the government itself, and from officials, then I think we have a high likelihood of success on the merits because we are taking their own word for it. They are going to have to contradict themselves to come up with anything that controverts their very own statements.

As to a fundamental right, I direct the Court to Washington vs. Glucksberg, which I note was cited at length

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by the Court's recent decision in Dobbs. And it says the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe 2 fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process 3

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serve a compelling state interest.

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briefing. It just says no fundamental right is involved. 7

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So the issue of treatment -- you say treatment.

15:07:58 9 vaccine. You say tomato I say tomatto. This is a lot more

is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to

The government never addresses this in their

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than that. This is the central fact question of the case.

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It prevents it from being decided on the government's motion

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to dismiss, and it shows why we should win on the merits of

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the case.

With regard to irreparable harm, Your Honor, which

I have not addressed, the law is clear that once there is a

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fundamental right established, that, in and of itself,

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illustrates irreparable harm. The government just avoids

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our entire argument by saying there is no fundamental right

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to a vaccine -- to not take a vaccine, but that's not at all

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what we are saying. We are saying there is a fundamental

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right not to take a medical treatment, and this is a medical

I want to point out that the government cites a

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treatment not a vaccine. So, they just skirt the issue.

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Tenth Circuit case involving Dr. Schrier which the Tenth

15:09:25 25 Circuit didn't find a fundamental right. That was a First

Amendment case. But the Tenth Circuit gives a great presentation on the very thing I just said, that if there is a fundamental right involved, which there is here, then irreparable harm is shown. So, finally, on this point, Your Honor, the Fifth Circuit in the OSHA matter, the BTA case, which was appealed ultimately to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's decision there and struck down the OSHA regulation, the ETS.

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And the Fifth Circuit said the irreparable harm is exactly what Dr. Griner is presented with here. It's a choice between a jab and a job. And the Court said that cannot take place. And the Supreme Court upheld it. If that was enough to find irreparable harm in that case, then it should be enough to find it here. So, we have shown clearly that he can't practice, that his privileges are revoked. We have shown it in emails. We have shown it in his declarations.

With regard to the preliminary injunction motion, I think we win that. We show irreparable harm on both fact as well as law. So there's two ways we get there. With regard to balancing the equities, you raised a very good point when you were talking to counsel on the other side, and you said: What about naturally immunity?

I mean, what the government always does in this case is they always come -- in these cases is they always

come in and say: Your Honor, if you don't allow us to do this people are going to die.

And, you know, sitting in your chair, that's a tough decision. This case is easier for you, Your Honor, because, number 1, the government admits that what it's doing doesn't prevent transmission. So it just doesn't work.

Number 2. The man is already naturally immune.

And we can look -- once again, you don't have to get into the studies. All you've got to do is look at the CMS itself, the mandate, where it says that natural -- those with natural immunity are only in very rare case infectious and are not considered a source of infection.

naturally immunity. And they include people with natural immunity in their analysis. We point that out to the Court in the Complaint. And that's at 61, 604 in the mandate. So, I believe we have -- Judge, there is no public policy argument that can support a so-called vaccine that just doesn't work, a vaccine that doesn't prevent transmission and only makes people feel better if they get sick. That's not what the law -- all the law on vaccines has been based on.

Final word on Jacobson. If anything, Jacobson supports our Tenth Amendment argument, our dual sovereignty

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argument, Your Honor, because what it stood for is only the
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              fact that the state of Massachusetts had the legislative
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              authority to pass a law that said a health body, a local
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              health agency could mandate a vaccine. It was totally at
              the state level, and this is just totally missed by the
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              government. They try to make it look like it held that the
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              federal government could do something. It never held that
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              the federal government could do anything. All it said was
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              the constitution at that time did not prohibit the
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              government, the local, state government from doing what it
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              did. So it didn't have anything to do with this case, which
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              does with the federal government. And the other thing is it
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              only talked to a vaccine, and we're saying it's not a
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              vaccine. Once again, they just assume away our major
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              argument.
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                       THE COURT:
                                   Thank you.
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                       MR. WENTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. I think I hit
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              everything.
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                       THE COURT: I can't imagine that you didn't.
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              you, Mr. Wentz.
                       All right. Mr. McElvain.
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                       MR. MC ELVAIN:
                                       Thank you, Your Honor. I just have
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              a handful of points I'd like to touch on. Apart from this
              handful of points, I believe I'll rest on my briefs and my
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              prior presentation unless the Court has questions, of
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course.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MC ELVAIN: But just to dive right in, first my colleague questions whether the effectiveness of the vaccine was at issue in the Supreme Court's decision of Biden vs. Missouri, and I would just reiterate that it was directly at The plaintiffs in that case had argued that the vaccines were not effective or that there was not a showing on the record there that the vaccines were effective. Supreme Court rejected that claim. It applied arbitrary and capricious review under the administrative procedure act and found that the Secretary -- I'm sorry. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary had reasonably found that the vaccines were effective in preventing transmission and that they were necessary to prevent the transmission of the virus to the vulnerable populations at hospitals funded by the Medicare and Medicaid programs, residents of nursing homes funded by the Medicare and Medicaid programs and so on. So that was directly at issue in the Supreme

Court's decision, and the Supreme Court upheld the Secretary's finding.

Second. This perhaps is just repeating a point that I made earlier, but as I understand plaintiff's argument on the due process point, again they appear to be assuming that a vaccine must be 100 percent effective to

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qualify as a vaccine under -- under Jacobson, and that just 1 simply is not the law. No vaccine is ever 100 percent 2 15:20:25 effective. There will always be some breakthrough 3 infections. What the Secretary has found, and the Supreme 4 5 Court again upheld the reasonableness of his findings, is that even in cases where there are breakthrough infections, 6 15:20:56 that the evidence tilts in favor of a finding that the 7 person with the breakthrough infection is less likely to 8 transmit the virus to a patient in a hospital or resident of 9 a nursing home, what have you. 10

> So the Secretary erred on the side of caution, on the side of protecting these vulnerable populations as was his statutory duty. And the fact that there is not perfect, 100 percent effectiveness is simply beside the point.

> Third. The plaintiffs have questioned whether we can even get into these facts on a motion to dismiss. Again, I would remind the Court that this is simply rational basis review. The plaintiff's burden on rational basis review is to negate any possible finding that could support the Secretary's conclusion, and that is something that the Court certainly can consider on a motion to dismiss.

And, again, Jacobson lays out the Rule here. Jacobson applied what today we would understand to be rational basis review, and the Court was absolutely clear that that is a matter for policy makers, not the Court, not

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plaintiff to address, to weigh whatever conflicting evidence
there may be, and to resolve any uncertainties in scientific
evidence as may be necessary to, again, err on the side of
caution to protect vulnerable populations.

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The fourth point I would like to address goes to the Tenth Amendment claim. Again, the plaintiffs assert that -- that the Rule rests on a claimed police power. Ιt does not. Congress has enacted legislation under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. That's spending clause legislation, and it's perfectly within Congress's power to impose conditions on federal funds that may touch on issues like health and safety that are otherwise considered to be within the states' powers. One example would be South Dakota vs. Dole where the Supreme Court upheld a provision relating to drinking age in exchange for Federal Transportation funds. That was considered to be perfectly valid even though the drinking age is something you would consider -- usually consider to be a matter for state legislation.

Bringing the point even closer to home here, the vaccine rule under the Medicare and Medicaid programs is part of a longer series of regulations that address standards for hospitals and nursing homes, including specifically infection control regulations. It is perfectly valid. It raises no constitutional problems whatsoever for

15:25:52 the Secretary to insist, say that a doctor with the flu 1 stays at home that day, that a person with an open wound is 2 not coming into physical contact with a patient; other 3 standards like that, that are designed for infection 15:26:27 control. The Supreme Court found that this vaccine rule was 5 essentially the equivalent of another infection control 6 7 regulation that has long been in place under the Medicare 15:26:49 and Medicaid program and causes no greater statutory or constitutional problem than any of these other regulations 9 10 do. And finally, I would conclude with the point that, 11 you know, we've cited a you great deal of cases, the First 12 15:27:29 Circuit, the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, District 13 Courts throughout the land. There is not a single Court 14 that has found that there is a valid due process claim 1.5 15:28:01 against either this vaccine rule or other vaccine rules 16 17 imposed by federal, state or local entities. What the plaintiffs are asking you to do is to be the first Court in 18 the entire country to find that there is a due process claim 19 15:28:23 against these vaccination rules. 20 21 We urge the Court not to adopt that invitation and, with that, I will rest unless you have any further 22 questions, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: I have -- let me ask you about the 24

argument that the government's own findings, assertions,

15:29:02 1 comments suggest that this Covid vaccine is really not a
2 vaccine but it's a form of treatment. Mr. Wentz, of course,
3 spoke about that at length. Do you have any comments on
4 that?

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MR. MC ELVAIN: Yes. That goes back to my prior point that I believe plaintiffs are assuming that a vaccine must be 100 percent effective in order to -- for a rule relating to that vaccine to be legal. And, again, that is simply not the standard. He quoted a passage from the Federal Register Notice wherein the Secretary recited that the effectiveness of the vaccines against transmission is not known, but there are other passages in the Federal Register that say that the evidence tends to indicate that in fact the vaccines are effective against transmission. And that's evidence that has been further confirmed, even after the issuance of the Rule, with new scientific evidence.

So, is there perfect scientific knowledge to this effect? No. You know, the studies are ongoing. But it's the Secretary's responsibility, not the Court's responsibility to weigh the conflicting scientific evidence, if there is in fact any conflicting evidence, and make the judgment as who how to proceed in the face of that evidence when he has a statutory duty to protect vulnerable populations like patients in hospitals, residents of nursing

homes.

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The plaintiff's counsel referred also to some statements from the drug manufacturers in December, 2020 which, at that time, it was not known as to whether the vaccines would produce immunity. Again that's simply beside the point because these are statements from December, 2020. The Secretary issued his rule on November, 2021. There has been substantial development in the scientific evidence in the meantime that supported the Secretary's findings that the vaccines are effective. And, again, that is a finding that has been specifically upheld by the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. McElvain.

Mr. Wentz?

MR. MC ELVAIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have anything else you want to say? I'll give you five minutes if you have any other rebuttals. I mean you've -- go ahead.

MR. WENTZ: I'll be quick, Your Honor. We're not -- we're not saying that it's not a vaccine because it's not 100 percent effective. We never say that. We simply rely on evidence that we presented that it's from the government itself, government websites. With regard to that last point about some of the things that we cited being from 2020, that's because the EUA just -- the emergency use authorization took place back then, and it didn't test for

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the Court.

transmission. It just tested for symptoms.

CDC's own website about Omicron is just sitting there. 3 That's current. And they say it's likely that you'll get 15:34:28 infected and what this really does is just make you feel 5 better. So that's valid, regular stuff, right there before 6

> With regard to the rational basis review point, if you assume away a fundamental right, which we assert in our Complaint, and we well-plead in our Complaint, if you just ignore it, then you get a rational basis. I mean, that's true. But we wrote the Complaint, we wrote it the way we did, and we very clearly allege that this is a treatment, not a vaccine. Therefore, as a treatment, we have a fundamental you right to reject it. And that is the fundamental right involved. So, every time you ask that question, they skip over that issue. They don't have a good answer for you, Your Honor.

The other thing is that what I read you from the

And we're not asking you to be the first Court to hold that there is some due process right to refuse a vaccine, we're not asking you to do that. What we're asking you to do is allow us to explore before the Court the factual issue of whether this is -- what is this thing that people are being forced to take? And is it a Cruzan or is it over on the other side of the fence? We allege it's a

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15:36:17 25 Cruzan. We allege it's a treatment. We allege there's a fundamental right.

With regard to the tenth amendment, a lot of what the Court -- what the government argues effectively just overrides the checks and balances of the constitution. If the Spending Clause can allow the government, the federal government to take over all of the police powers of the state, then I guess NFIB V. Sebelius just doesn't stand for anything. But that's solid law. And the concept of dual sovereignty, you know, Alexander Hamilton after the convention said: We have split the atom of sovereignty, and what wasn't given by the states was not given, and it was kept back by the states.

And the states never gave their police power. This was not argued in the Biden case. It was not addressed in the Biden case. That is not binding on this issue. It's also binding -- not binding because no one in that case ever argued the fact issue before this Court, the differences between a treatment and a vaccine, and that was nowhere addressed. So this is a unique case for the Court. I realize that. And we -- we believe that we meet the burdens, Your Honor.

Effectiveness? We're not claiming effectiveness or not effectiveness. That's not -- we're not saying that.

What we're saying is it's a treatment, not a vaccine. So,

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all right. Those are the issues that they said.

In closing, Your Honor, I would just like to point out that Dr. Griner, with regard to money damages, is not the kind of guy that can be compensated for what he's devoted his entire life to, his entire life. Read in his declaration, Your Honor, this man is passionate about saving these kids. This is his life. He has created a foundation to raise money to do it. He's dedicated. His family is dedicated to this. He speaks of these kids, when you get to know him, that he heals as his family.

Saying that he can be compensated by monetary damages is like saying, if you took away Pavarotti's ability to sing, that his life could be -- would not change. His life would have no meaning if Pavarotti could not sing. And this is the same instance here in this case. This man is passionate about this. There is no monetary compensation. He is being denied his life. We ask you to give it back to him. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. McElvain.

I'll take these motions under advisement and get a ruling out in due course. We'll be in recess. The hearing will be closed. Thanks.

MR. WENTZ: That you.

MR. MC ELVAIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

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1	(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
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4	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
5	STATE OF UTAH)
6) ss.
7	COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
8	
9	I, REBECCA JANKE, do hereby certify that I am a
10	Certified Court Reporter for the State of Utah;
11	That as such Reporter I attended the hearing of
12	the foregoing matter on July 6, 2022, and thereat reported
13	in Stenotype all of the testimony and proceedings had, and
14	caused said notes to be transcribed into typewriting, and
15	the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 52 constitute a full,
16	true and correct record of the proceedings transcribed.
17	That I am not of kin to any of the parties and
18	have no interest in the outcome of the matter;
19	And hereby set my hand and seal this 20th day of
20	July, 2022.
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25	REBECCA JANKE, CSR, RPR, RMR